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Economic Regulation: Recentralisation of Power or Improved 
Quality of Regulation? 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Independent regulatory agencies in Ireland play a pivotal role in determining 
price, service quality, entry and other competitive conditions in the energy, 
telecommunications, postal services and transport (buses, airports and taxis) sectors.1  
These regulatory agencies, sometimes referred to as economic regulators, have 
increased in number since the mid-1990s (Table 1).  Between 1996 and 2001, for 
example, regulators were created for electricity, airports and telecommunications.  
The scope of these regulatory agencies has typically increased.2  For example, the 
regulation of gas was combined with electricity in 2002, postal services with 
telecommunications also in 2002.   The creation of these agencies reflected the wider 
regulatory reform agenda, inspired by the OECD (1997; 2001; 2005) and a series of 
European Union legislative initiatives, particularly in energy and telecommunications 
(Department of Public Enterprise, 2000).  However, there was also a more general 
expansion in the number and role of government agencies dating from the late 1980s 
as part of the New Public Management.3  This expansion occurred in agencies with 
responsibility, not only for regulation, but also the delivery of public services, advice, 
consultation and so on. 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 In some other jurisdictions, such as the UK, the range of activities regulated by independent agencies 
is larger than Ireland, including, for example, water and railways.  However, in these two instances in 
Ireland the provision of services is retained within the state sector and not subject to oversight by a 
regulatory agency. In the case of water charges for households were abolished in 1997, although there 
are moves to reintroduce such charges, while for commercial premises local authorities set water 
charges and provide the service.  
2 The Commission for Aviation is an exception.  See Table 1, footnote b, for details. 
3 For details of the growth in agencies by type see Hardiman (2009, Figure 7, p. 60); Hardiman & 
MacCarthaigh (2010, Figure 9, p. 386).  These sources also discuss the reasons for the growth in these 
agencies.  
3 
The economic regulatory agencies assumed functions that had previously been 
exercised by the relevant Minister, although, as discussed below, the functions had 
been administered in quite a different manner. The Minister, however, still plays an 
important role in the activities of the regulated sector.  Regulated firms, typically the 
former incumbent monopolist, continue to be state-owned and report to the Minister 
(Table 1).  The Minister also retains responsibility for policy development and has the 
power to issue policy directions of a general nature to regulatory agencies.  Individual 
decisions on pricing or investment are, on the contrary, the responsibility of the 
regulatory agency, not the Minister.  Of course, the line can be blurred between 
individual decisions and policy directions of more general nature. 
Table 1 
Economic Regulators in Ireland: 2010/11 
Regulator, Year 
Established & 
Terminated 
Sectors Public 
Ownership 
Private 
Ownershipa 
Commission for Aviation 
Regulation (“CAR”), 
2001- 
Dublin Airportb  Dublin Airport 
Authority 
None 
Commission for Energy 
Regulation (“CER”), 
1999c- 
Electricity, gas ESB, EirGrid, 
Bord Gais 
Yes 
Commission  for 
Communications 
Regulation (“ComReg”), 
1997d- 
Telecommunications, 
postal services 
An Post Yese 
Commission for Taxi 
Regulation (“CTR”), 
2004-2010f 
Taxis None Yes 
Department of Transport 
(“DoT”), 1932-2010g 
Buses Dublin Bus, Bus 
Eireann 
Yes 
National Transport 
Authority (“NTA”), 2009- 
Taxis, buses  Dublin Bus, Bus 
Eireann 
Yes 
a. In competition with some or all of the publicly-owned entities.  In the case of buses, or example, 
competition exists mostly on an inter-urban basis, while in electricity competition exists in generation.   
b. CAR originally regulated Dublin, Cork and Shannon airports, but in 2004 Cork and Shannon were 
removed from the ambit of regulation.  The Department of the Taoiseach (2009, p. 11) announced that 
it has been decided that the CAR will be merged with the NTA. As yet, legislation has not been 
presented to the Dail. 
c. Originally the Commission for Electricity Regulation.  The name change to the Commission for 
Energy Regulation took place when natural gas regulation was added to the agency’s remit in 2002.  
d. Originally the Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation, changing to its current 
name in 2002 when it was given responsibility for all telecommunications regulation and postal 
services. 
e. Eircom, the former state-owned telecommunications provider was privatised in 1999. 
f. The Commission for Taxi Regulation was dissolved in December 2010 and incorporated into the 
NTA. 
g. The bus licensing function of the Department of Transport was transferred to the NTA in 2010. 
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Source: EIU (2009), Department of the Taoiseach (2009), Massey (2007) and information provided by 
regulators. 
Irrespective of whether a Minister4 or a regulatory agency makes regulatory 
decisions, such decisions have the potential to affect not only the competitiveness of 
the economy, given the significance of regulated activities as inputs, particularly to 
the traded sector of the economy, but also the well-being of consumers.  The scope of 
economic regulation is largely confined to activities that are, by and large, in the non-
traded sector and hence not subject to competition from producers located elsewhere 
in the EU and beyond.5  Important parts of regulated sectors are natural monopolies 
(e.g. the gas transmission system or the electricity grid) or oligopolies, with high 
barriers to entry (e.g. electricity generation or mobile phone networks).  Hence issues 
relating to independence, accountability, expertise and governance – to the extent that 
they affect the quality of regulatory decisions and the evidence is that they do6 – are 
important for the economic development and competitiveness of the Irish economy.  
Institutions and how they are structured matter. 
After the growth of the economic regulatory agencies, government decided to 
take stock and review progress.  It is to be welcomed as good administrative practice.  
A report was commissioned by the Department of the Taoiseach on the regulatory 
environment in Ireland, which benchmarked the performance of economic regulators 
against their peers in other countries and made a series of recommendations to 
improve the regulatory structure (EIU, 2009).  Shortly after this was completed, the 
government issued its Government Statement on Economic Regulation (“the 
Government Statement”) in October 2009.7  While government recognised the 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 The term Minister is used for shorthand to include the relevant department, although it is recognised 
that the Minister and the department may not always agree on policy. 
5 This is beginning to change.  In electricity, for example, interconnectors between Ireland and Great 
Britain will expose electricity generators in Ireland to external competition from Great Britain and 
beyond.  Increased competition is likely to be accompanied by less regulation.  
6 This connection is discussed further in Section II below. 
7 The Government Statement concentrated on the economic regulators which are listed in Table 1 
above.  The EIU (2009) had slightly wider remit, including financial services and health and safety.  
However, since the focus of the paper is the reforms proposed in the Government Statement, attention 
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importance of the quality of regulation to the economy, the emphasis in the 
Government Statement is on “strengthening the mechanisms to assess the 
performance of regulators and to monitor their delivery on the strategic objectives and 
priorities set for them” (Department of the Taoiseach, 2009, p.1).  The Government 
Statement sets out a series of reforms affecting the structure, governance and 
accountability of economic regulators.   
There is always likely to be a tension between the independence of regulators 
from government and accountability of regulators to government.8  Getting the 
balance correct is not easy.  Too much control by government may compromise the 
independence of regulators and the benefits that flow from such independence; too 
much independence results in regulators that are not sufficiently accountable to 
government.  The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the Government 
Statement, which is likely to increase the power of government vis a vis regulators, 
strikes the right balance between regulatory independence and accountability and the 
implications for the quality of regulation in the activities mentioned above.     
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections.  Section II outlines 
why it is important that regulatory agencies are independent of government (and other 
interests such as the regulated entities) and how that promotes sensible investment 
and other decisions by the regulated entities.  With that as background, Section III 
discusses the ways in which regulatory agencies are currently accountable to 
Ministers as well as the proposals in the Government Statement and initial 
implementation steps.  The Government Statement provides little, if anything, by way 
of justification or rationale for the proposed erosion of the independence of regulatory 
agencies through the strengthening of accountability mechanisms.  Recourse is made, 
in Section IV, to the background EIU report referred to above and developments at 
EU level in telecommunications and energy for an explanation.  However, these 
                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
is focused on the economic regulators, with limited reference to other regulators such as the Central 
Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland. 
8 Government would include not only Ministers but also the Oireachtas. 
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sources do not provide a clear rationale.  On the contrary, to a considerable degree, 
the movement towards greater accountability to government by regulatory agencies is 
inconsistent with the views expressed in these two sources.  Thus in Section V two 
possible explanations are presented for greater accountability to government.  The 
paper concludes by assessing whether the proposals in the Government Statement are 
likely to improve the quality of regulatory decisions and discusses the wider 
implications for the economy. 
II. A Comparison of Two Models of Regulatory Decision-Making: 
Independent Regulatory Agencies vs. The Minister 
 
In this section the merits of two models – regulatory agencies and the Minister 
- for making regulatory decisions are considered.  These two models need to be seen 
in context.  Regulatory agencies were created in Ireland as in many other European 
jurisdictions as part of a broader process of economic liberalisation of a sector (e.g., 
energy, telecommunications, postal services), usually at the behest of an EU 
initiative.  Prior to liberalisation, the sector may have been dominated by a state-
owned vertically integrated monopolist, with the Minister acting both as the regulator 
as well as owner.  Post-liberalisation the state-owned firm may be privatised and/or 
broken up, while increased entry and greater competition is encouraged by the 
regulatory agency as a method of facilitating competition, so as to increase efficiency, 
raise innovation, encourage new product development and lower prices.  In 
electricity, for example, entry has taken place in generation and supply, while the 
operation of the transmission system is no longer the sole responsibility of the former 
vertically-integrated state-owned monopolist, the Electricity Supply Board (“ESB”), 
but a newly created entity, EirGrid.  It was no longer tenable in the post-liberalisation 
world for the Minister to be both regulator and owner of the dominant player in a 
particular sector (Ferris, 2001, p. 4). 
In discussing the merits of the two regulatory decision-making models, 
attention is concerned primarily with economic regulations, which have been defined 
by the OECD (2001, p. 17) as those that “intervene directly in market decisions such 
as pricing, competition, market entry or exit.”  In terms of the characteristics of an 
independent regulatory agency reference is made to the Department of Public 
Enterprise (2000) vision of what powers and procedures should apply with respect to 
regulatory agencies, which is consistent with various OECD (1997; 2005) statements 
7 
on principles for regulatory quality and performance, EU guidance and legislation,9 
and regulatory practice in Ireland (Doyle, 1997; EIU, 2009).  In contrast, the Minister 
as a regulator is not drawn from some model of what constitutes best practice, but 
rather on what appears to have been the historical record in Ireland.   
An independent regulatory agency is likely to exhibit the following 
characteristics: appointment by the Minister of the most senior posts on merit after an 
independent selection process, with very narrow grounds for dismissal (e.g., ill health, 
stated misbehaviour) and with appointment for a sufficiently long period to ensure 
independence; clear internally consistent statutory goals; open, transparent impartial 
decision-making, with reasoned published decisions; secure funding; appeal 
mechanisms - judicial review and, on the merits, in limited specific circumstances to 
an expert panel or court; and, the Minister’s role is confined in general to policy 
development with the day-to-day tasks of regulation devolved to the regulatory 
agency.  In contrast, Ministerial regulation is conducted within the confines of 
departmental structures, with processes that are often opaque often with little or no 
published reasoning for particular decisions.  
2.1 Reducing Conflicts of Interest 
When a Minister makes a regulatory decision several sets of considerations 
are likely to colour his or her judgment, which is illustrated by a request for a price 
increase by the regulated entities.  First, the Minister has political considerations, 
which are likely to reflect short-term electoral factors.  If the sought-for price increase 
is filed before an election then if it were granted there might be a loss of electoral 
support for the Minister’s party, causing the Minister to defer, reduce or refuse the 
requested price increase.  Second, regulatory considerations, which may be quite 
vague in legislative terms, but nevertheless if a well argued case for a price increase is 
sustained then the Minister might be minded to approve the increase.  This is 
                                                 
 
 
 
9 For further details see the discussion in Section IV below on recent EU legislation in energy and 
telecommunications. 
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particularly the case if the Minister’s department does not have the expertise and 
knowledge to evaluate such requests and so is likely to rely on the regulated entity’s 
expertise and knowledge.  Third, ownership considerations, where some or all of the 
regulated firms are state-owned.  Here the Minister as owner may wish to maximise 
and/or maintain the value of the state-owned firm and so award the price increase 
even if it is not justified in full.  Such increases may also permit the regulated entity 
to pay wage increases, thus avoiding a possible strike.10  Fourth, the Minister may 
have certain policy preferences or desired outcomes which the regulated entity may 
be able to supply.  Hence the Minister’s decision to award a price increase or approve 
an investment, irrespective of its merits, may be conditional, implicitly if not 
explicitly, on the accommodation of their policy preferences.  In other words, there is 
a form of regulatory barter or exchange. 
These conflicting motivations make Ministerial regulatory decisions difficult 
to predict and this uncertainty is likely to raise costs, as well as distort investment and 
pricing decisions.11  In contrast, the regulatory agency is much less likely to be 
subject to such conflicts.  The regulatory agency should not consider short-term 
political considerations, while the strength of the balance sheet of the state-owned 
regulated firm is of interest only to the extent that it is adequate, consistent with the 
regulatory agency meeting its statutory objectives.12  The regulatory agency is less 
likely to be at an informational disadvantage compared to the Minister, given its 
staffing of economic, legal and engineering expertise, plus the information revealed 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 The latter two roles were pointed out in the Department of Public Enterprise (2000, p. 5) in 
describing what it calls the traditional model of Ministerial regulation prior to the advent of regulatory 
agencies.   
11 Doyle (1997, p. 7) refers to these as “political risks.” 
12 There is an issue that privately owned firms may take on excessive leverage and use its inability to 
raise additional funds for vital infrastructure investment to argue that it should receive lenient 
regulatory treatment.  One solution to this problem is to allow the regulatory agency to have step-in 
rights.  For further discussion see Gorecki et al (2010). 
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in the extensive consultation process in making regulatory decisions.13  Independent 
regulatory agencies may be better able to attract the required professional expertise. 
The regulatory agency’s decisions are concerned with meeting its statutory objectives 
and in making decisions in accordance with those objectives it does so within the 
appropriate time horizon, with its reasoning presented in a published decision.  This is 
more likely to be conducive to regulatory certainty and predictability than regulation 
by the Minister. 
2.2 Credible Pre-Commitment14    
In many regulated sectors, such as energy, telecommunications and some 
aspects of transport such as airport terminals, investment decisions are made with 
respect to long-lived capital intensive assets with a high element of sunk (i.e. 
irrecoverable) cost.  For example, a combined cycle gas turbine electricity generation 
plant has a life span of 35 to 40 years, with a cost of capital “slightly larger than all 
the non-energy operating costs – labour and materials” (Fitz Gerald, et al, 2005, 
p.54).  In order to facilitate such investments a stable predictable environment 
minimises uncertainty.  The more uncertain the economic environment the higher the 
return demanded by the investor to compensate for the increased risk.  In some 
instances investment may not take place at all or be deferred, leading to under-
investment.  One source of uncertainty concerns the likelihood that once a long-lived 
capital intensive asset is built, due to action by the state, the owner may only be able 
to recover variable costs, with little or no compensation for the capital costs, which 
are sunk.15  In other words, the sunk costs are expropriated.  
                                                 
 
 
 
13 Purchasers of the regulated service are likely to have an interest in low prices and have market 
expertise and information that they have an incentive to supply to the regulatory agency so as to defeat 
or reduce a proposed price increase. 
14 For a discussion of pre-commitment see Trillas (2010, pp. 2-5) and references cited therein. 
15 This can and does occur with respect to investments by multinationals in copper, mineral and 
petroleum extraction, where the host country may offer, initially at least, large investment incentives 
and then revise the arrangements once the investment is completed, referred to as the obsolescing 
bargain.  See Bersten et al (1978) for discussion. 
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The Minister acting as regulator is more likely to expropriate the sunk costs.  
Examples cited of such behaviour usually refer to Ministers or Governments rather 
than regulatory agencies.16 This failure to cover sunk investment costs need not, of 
course, be explicit; the Minister could just refuse or reduce the requested price 
increases.  The motive may reflect the political considerations referred to above in 
terms of electoral factors.  There is some evidence consistent with this behaviour in 
Ireland when the Minister was both regulator and owner of ESB and as such could 
grant or deny requested price increases.  Decisions were often deferred for 
considerable periods.  In one case the Minister had not made a decision for seven 
years, apparently because of the overall profitability of the ESB, after a request for a 
price increase made in January 1995 (OECD, 2001, p. 282).  In another case the 
Minister, in June 2000, in order to combat inflation, made a commitment that 
“electricity prices would not rise later in the year” (Fitz Gerald et al, 2005, p. 60).17   
In order to provide a commitment that the state will not be involved in such 
opportunistic behaviour, one option is set up an independent regulatory agency that 
will make decisions taking into account the need to compensate for the full cost of an 
asset and not just the variable costs.18  However, for this pre-commitment to be a 
credible mechanism the regulatory agency must be properly independent, in the terms 
described above.  If this is the case then it will reduce investment risks and thus lower 
costs, benefiting purchasers of the regulated services and the wider economy.19   
                                                 
 
 
 
16 See discussion and references in footnotes 14 and 15 above. 
17 As the authors note, “[T]his raised the prospect that new entrants would face unfair competition in 
the future due to the government’s use of its power as shareholder in ESB to restrict price increases” 
(Fitz Gerald et al, 2005, p. 60). 
18 For a discussion of the importance of pre-commitment in the context of the electricity sector in 
Ireland, see Lyons et al (2007). 
19 A good example of regulatory independence was the decision by the UK government to switch 
responsibility in 1997 for setting interest rates from the Minister to the Bank of England.  When the 
Minister had responsibility there was a concern that short-term considerations, such as the electoral 
cycle, would influence such decisions.  However, a credible Bank of England with an inflation target 
would be immune from such considerations.  The markets believed that the Bank would be 
independent and as a result the UK/German interest differential declined substantially.  
11 
There is a link between reducing conflicts of interest and credible pre-
commitment, if regulated entities are retained in public ownership, which goes 
beyond establishing an independent regulatory agency.  The Minister may still, 
despite the existence of an independent regulatory agency, intervene in favour of the 
publicly owned regulated entity for reasons alluded to above.  This is likely to create 
regulatory uncertainty and perhaps blunt competition.  There is evidence that when 
the state retains public control in a sector subject to regulation that regulatory 
outcomes favour the incumbent.20  One way in which the Minister can credibly pre-
commit to not making such interventions is to privatise publicly owned entities.21 
However, in several of the sectors subject to economic regulation – airports, 
electricity, gas, postal services, buses - government in Ireland has decided not to 
follow this option; the exception was telecommunications, where Eircom was 
privatised.22   
2.3 Lessening Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture is when the regulator, whether it is the Minister or a 
regulatory agency, sees the world from the viewpoint of those firms that are being 
regulated.  In other words, the regulator acts in the interests of the regulated entity.23  
A low evidentiary threshold is likely to be set for price increases; the entry of new 
firms is likely to be refused or made difficult; and, other regulatory decisions are 
likely to benefit the incumbent regulated firm(s).  Consumers and the wider economy 
suffer as a result and the objectives of regulation, which are often couched in terms of 
efficiency and low prices, compromised.  While regulatory capture can occur 
irrespective of the regulatory regime it is more likely to occur when the Minister is 
                                                 
 
 
 
20 For details see Edwards & Waverman (2005), which is confined to telecommunications, but the 
authors argue the results can be generalised to other network infrastructure industries such as gas, 
electricity and rail.  The authors also find that independent regulators can mitigate the impact the 
presence of a state-owned regulated firm. 
21 Gorecki et al (2010) considers public policy towards state assets and where the arguments are 
strongest for such sales. 
22 See Table 1 above for details. 
23 For a discussion of regulatory capture see, for example, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1989). 
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the regulator, especially when – as is often the case in Ireland – one of the regulated 
firms is state-owned.24  The state-owned regulated firm will have constant contact 
with officials and the Minister, which may take the view that it is important to protect 
and promote that firm.  In other words, the interests of the regulated firm become 
identified with government policy.  It is a variant of, “What is Good for GM is Good 
for America.” 
Of course, it could be argued that there is a limit to such regulatory capture in 
that there are appeal mechanisms to the Courts from a Minister’s decision.25  
However, these appeals are costly, with uncertain outcomes. Furthermore, the case 
can always be settled by the Minister out of Court with no precedent-setting decision, 
judicial or otherwise, especially if the settlement details are not made public and there 
is no third party appeal.  There are examples consistent with Ministerial regulatory 
capture.  These include the refusal to licence a rival airline operator to Aer Lingus, 
the national flag carrier, since requests were made dating back to 1935.  Deregulation 
eventually occurred on the Dublin-London route in 1986.26  More recently, the 
unwarranted interpretation of regulations by the Minister to disadvantage a new 
entrant in the provision of bus services in favour of the state-owned incumbent, 
Dublin Bus.27 As shown in Table 1 it was only in 2010 that responsibility for bus 
regulation was assumed by the National Transport Authority.28 
In contrast, regulatory agencies are less likely to be as subject to regulatory 
capture.  Regulators’ processes are open and transparent, thus making their decisions 
                                                 
 
 
 
24 In Ireland, publicly-owned firms are present in gas, electricity, airports, postal services, buses, while 
in telecommunications the former publicly-owned firm was privatised.   
25 Appeal mechanisms are discussed further in Section III below. 
26 See Barrett (2006). 
27 See High Court, Digital Messenger Limited Trading As Swords Express and Minister for Transport 
and Dublin Bus [2010] IEHC 311, delivered on 30 July 2010.  This judgment may be accessed    
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/bce24a8184816f1580256ef30048ca50/8f959bc0e75602c88025778
b003de28d?OpenDocument.  Accessed 7 September 2010. 
28 Bus licensing rules have become more consumer focussed with the announcement of new NTA 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Public Buss Passenger Services by the National Transport Authority in 
December 2010 which were welcomed by the Competition Authority as clearing the “way for greater 
competition in commercial public bus services.” (Competition Authority, 2010). 
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more subject to scrutiny and objections by purchasers of the regulated firms’ services.  
Regulatory agencies, unlike a Minister responsible for the state-owned firm, do not 
have an interest or responsibility as a shareholder in that firm.  Hence the regulatory 
agency is more likely to make decisions in the interests of the purchases of the 
services of regulated firms than in the interests of the regulated firms themselves.  
Nevertheless, regulatory agencies are not immune;29 they may encourage entry and 
then feel the need to ensure the survival of these entrants, even when they have failed 
the market test, thus protecting competitors rather than competition.  Alternatively, if 
a regulatory agency has as one its major objectives promoting the success of the 
regulated activity then it may identify with those interests as appears to have occurred 
in financial regulation.30 In other words, the statutory objective of the regulator makes 
it obliged to act in the interests of the regulated firm(s) usually at the expense of 
consumers.   
If regulatory capture occurs under independent regulation then there is likely 
to be a difference between de jure and de facto regulation.  De jure regulation refers 
the legal formal framework of the regulatory agency as set out at the beginning of this 
section, while de facto regulation refers to what actually happens in practice.  Thus 
regulatory capture will result in a regulatory regime that is in practice less 
independent than that suggested by an examination of the statutory provisions relating 
to its administration. 
Independent regulatory agencies have distinct advantages over the Minister 
acting as a regulator in terms of reducing conflicts of interest, providing a credible 
mechanism for reducing the risk associated with investing in long-lived capital 
                                                 
 
 
 
29 Kay (2010) cites the example of the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) which regulated 
railways under legislation passed in 1887.  The Chairman was familiar with the railway industry 
having acted for the producers.  The Supreme Court decided a decade later that the rate-fixing 
agreement between railways was illegal.   
30 The Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland (“CBFSAI”) statutory objective was to 
promote the development of the financial services industry in Ireland, but not in such a way as not to 
affects its objective of contributing to the stability of the financial system.  Subsequently in 2010 the 
promotional aspect has been dropped as regulatory objective.  The regulatory approach of the CBFSAI 
is summarised in Honohan (2010, p. 16).  It is a case study to which further reference is made below. 
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intensive assets, with high sunk costs and being less subject to regulatory capture.  
These advantages are, of course, largely theoretical.  The question is whether in 
practice regulatory independence leads to better outcomes.  Here the evidence would 
suggest that the answer is yes.  Trillas (2010, p. 20) in a survey of the literature, plus 
some of their own work, concludes that “[T]here seems to be on balance a positive 
and significant impact of independence (together with other good governance 
attributes) on performance, although doubts remain about the magnitude of this 
effect.”  However, to some extent this conclusion may understate the impact of 
independent regulatory agencies, since varying degrees of regulatory independence 
are being compared, rather than a comparison between regulatory independence and 
the Minister acting as the regulator.   
III. Accountability of Regulatory Agencies: Past, Present and Future 
 
 Regulatory agencies are not, nor should they be, completely independent of 
government (and other interests).  However, exactly how such agencies should be 
accountable for their decisions and actions is the subject of legitimate debate.  
Existing accountability mechanisms are first outlined, before attention turns to the 
proposals in the Government Statement and, finally, to the moves to implement these 
proposals. 
3.1 The Status Quo Ex Ante 
Regulatory agencies are accountable, not only to the government, but others, in a 
variety of ways.  These include the following mechanisms:31  
• Ministers, on occasion, appoint the commissioners – the decision-makers – to 
regulatory agencies without an interview/open competition procedure.  Two 
of the current three commissioners of the CER were appointed in this way as 
were the Chairman of the NTA, although this is not the case for the other 
                                                 
 
 
 
31 Much of the current accountability mechanisms are detailed in EIU (2009). 
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economic regulators where the commissioners have to be appointed by an 
open competition run by the civil service and appointments commission;32 
• Although the statutory goals and objectives of a regulatory agency are set by 
the Oireachtas, given the control of the legislature by the executive in Ireland 
– discussed below – in effect these are written and formulated by the 
Minister.  However, Ministerial discretion is limited if the Oireachtas is 
transposing EU legislation; 
• The Minister can issue directives to the regulatory agencies concerning the 
factors to be taken into account in their decision-making process.  In some 
cases this power can only be exercised after public consultation.   This has 
been used in varying degrees: 15 in the case of ComReg; three, CAR; one, 
CER; and, none, CTR (EIU, 2009, p. 39);33 
• Decisions from the regulatory agencies can be appealed.  It is important to 
distinguish between judicial review and appeal on the merits.  Under judicial 
review the Court is concerned with how a decision is reached by a regulatory 
agency (or a Minister), so that only issues of fair procedures and due process 
are relevant.  In contrast, an appeal on the merits is concerned with whether 
                                                 
 
 
 
32 The appointment procedure is set out in EIU (2009, Table 8, p. 51), with the exception of the NTA.  
Here the Chairman and members of the Authority are selected by the Minister with no statutory 
requirement for an independent, open competition as the appropriate selection mechanism, although 
there has been some movement in that direction.  The Minister for Transport in appointing four of the 
eight members of the NTA in 2009 did so after inviting “applications from any person who wished to 
be considered for appointment.” (Response by Minister for Transport to oral questions in the Dail, 9 
December 2009).  The NTA members are, according to the legislation, persons who “in the opinion of 
the Minister have wide experience in relation to transport, industrial, commercial, financial, land use 
planning or environmental matters, the organisation of workers or administration.”  There is also an 
Advisory Council, the composition of which is modelled along the lines of social partnership, which is 
discussed further in Section 5.2 below.  The Advisory Council has, as yet, to be established.  If 
legislation appointing a mayor for Dublin becomes the law the Advisory Council is likely to be 
abolished.  Given that the CTR and the CAR – eventually – are to be rolled into the NTA, if the 
appointment process outlined above is used, then this signals a move away from open transparent 
appointment processes and thus is likely to reduce regulatory independence.  For details see the 
relevant legislation, the Dublin Transport Authority Act 2008 and the Public Transport Regulation Act 
2009, and the NTA website,  http://www.nationaltransport.ie/about.html. Accessed 21 December 2010. 
33 The frequency appears to refer to the period from the inception of the regulatory agency to March 
2009 when the EIU report was completed. 
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the right decision is made in view of the statutory regulatory objectives and 
the available evidence.  Appeals are sometimes made initially to a regulatory 
panel and then to the Courts, but in some cases directly to the Courts,34 with 
no expert panel.  The appeal mechanisms vary by regulatory agency (EIU, 
2009, Table 9, p. 56).  ComReg and CAR have been subject to a number of 
appeals; 
• Ministers can exercise moral suasion or soft power in terms of indicating 
what policy or even individual decisions might be, without issuing a policy 
direction.  This occurred with respect to a pricing decision of the CER at the 
behest of the Minister, discussed below;  
• Regulatory agencies appear before Oireachtas committees, sometimes 
involving robust exchanges as, for example, with respect to the CTR.35 
• Regulatory agencies are often funded by a levy on the regulated firms, and 
thus indirectly on consumers.  Regulated firms are likely to question 
excessive levies and thus promote efficiency. 
This is an extensive menu of accountability mechanisms.  They differ somewhat from 
regulatory agency to regulatory agency reflecting the fact that these agencies are to 
some extent all sui generis.   
3.2 The Government Statement Proposals. 
The Government Statement can be seen as a response to the EIU (2009, p. 162) 
recommendation, given the strong case for continued regulation in certain sectors, 
that “a restatement of the overall strategy, principles and objectives of regulation 
would be helpful” (emphasis on original).  It proposes a very extensive suite of 
measures to improve the quality of regulation.   After acknowledging the importance 
                                                 
 
 
 
34 This is usually the case with Ministerial regulatory decisions. 
35 For details see Gorecki (2009a).  However, although the exchanges were robust it is not clear how 
they held the CTR to account.  The Chairman of the Committee refused to accept the results of a 
careful study carried out for the CTR and instead preferred to rely on the casual empiricism of a couple 
of conversations with taxi drivers. 
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of the quality of economic regulation for competitiveness and growth, the 
Government Statement states that government “is now strengthening the mechanisms 
to assess the performance of regulators and monitor their delivery on the strategic 
objectives and priorities set for them” (Department of the Taoiseach, 2009, p. 1).  The 
proposals also allow the communication of “key Government priorities” to regulators 
(ibid, p. 1). No measures are proposed to strengthen the independence of regulatory 
agencies. 
The Government Statement proposals are as follows:36,37  
• More accountability and transparency through increased availability of 
information and the development of new measures on the performance and 
activities of regulatory agencies (ibid, paragraphs 2.1-2.9); 
• Greater political input and direction into the decisions and priorities of 
regulatory agencies in both the short (ibid, paragraphs 2.1-2.9) and longer 
term ( ibid, paragraphs 3.1-3.2): 
• Development of regulatory technical expertise within government 
departments (ibid, paragraphs 2.10-2.14)  
• No change in current system of appeals from a regulator’s decisions.  
Rejection of the idea of a single appeals body (ibid, paragraph 2.18); 
• Better budgetary scrutiny and cost controls through international comparisons 
(ibid, paragraphs 4.1-4.2) 
Some further elaboration on each of these is provided below. 
                                                 
 
 
 
36 The paragraph numbers are taken from Department of the Taoiseach (2009) and indicate where 
further details of the proposal may be found. 
37 There some other proposals to improve regulatory decision making, which are not discussed in this 
paper.  These are as follows: optimal configuration of regulatory agencies through amalgamations 
(ibid, paragraphs 4.3-5.1); greater consumer and industry input into regulatory agency decisions and 
processes (ibid, paragraphs 6.2-6.3); and, other issues such as commission and board structures and 
concurrent powers under the Competition Act for both regulators and the Competition Authority (ibid, 
paragraphs 2.15, 2.16, 2.17; 3.3). 
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Greater Political Direction 
The government proposes greater political accountability of regulators.  In this 
context accountability means that Ministers will have a greater say in setting the 
priorities, objectives and mandates of regulators than is currently the case.  The 
Government Statement’s proposals envisage several mechanisms or conduits through 
which such influence will be channelled.  
These channels include: 
• Statements of Strategy at least every five years that will not only take into 
account the regulators’ legislative objectives but also “any policy directions or 
weighting of priorities communicated by relevant Ministers or by Government 
in the context of the Annual Regulatory Forum” (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2009, paragraph 2.1): 
• Annual Output Statements relating inputs to outputs as well as reporting 
progress in meeting objectives set out in the Statement of Strategy.  It is to be 
submitted to the relevant Minister and Oireachtas Committee.  The Annual 
Output Statements “will also allow for Ministerial directions and priorities 
communicated by government to be formally incorporated into  strategic 
plans, thereby addressing the need for greater flexibility in the regulatory 
process in light of changing global markets and economic and technological 
conditions” (ibid, paragraph 2.3); 
• Performance indicators which “should be related to the fulfilment of their 
[the regulators] legislative mandates and to Ministerial directions and 
statements on priorities … “ (ibid, paragraph 2.4); 
• Public Interest Statements that set out how the regulators have taken into 
account the public interest objectives set out in legislation (e.g. consumer 
protection).  However, in doing so the regulator “will necessarily take account 
of any communication or direction from the relevant Minister of the policy 
objectives for the sector and Whole of Government issues raised in the context 
of the Annual Regulatory Forum” (ibid, paragraph 2.5). 
• Annual Regulatory Forum at which the Taoiseach, Tanaiste and other 
relevant Ministers and key regulators “whose work is central to Irish 
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economic performance” will attend (ibid, paragraph 2.7).  At the Forum the 
government’s “evolving priorities relating to the economy, competitiveness 
and competition issues” will be communicated to regulators (ibid, paragraph 
2.7).  Furthermore “the identification of clear priorities by Government and by 
Minister with sectoral responsibility will assist regulators to deploy resources 
appropriately in line with policy priorities and in the setting of appropriate 
performance indicators for regulators” (ibid, paragraph 2.8). 
• Five Year Reviews initiated by the relevant Minister of the roles and 
mandates of the regulators.  This reflects the view that the “role of regulation 
will evolve over time and it is important that this need is assessed 
periodically” (ibid, paragraph 3.1).  Such reviews would consider, for 
example, “provide a context within which sectoral amalgamations and broader 
mergers can be considered in the light of issues such as the changing 
mandates and converging technologies” (ibid, paragraph 3.2). 
These arrangements for greater political influence and direction of regulators create a 
number of channels through which government expresses its preferences as to what 
regulators should do: 
•  for Ministers – policy directives, statements on the weighing of priorities and 
somewhat vague communications; and, 
• for government as a whole – statements or expressions on evolving priorities 
and clear priorities.   
The degree to which these preferences are adhered to by regulators is then monitored 
and, to a lesser extent, enforced through a series of mechanisms from Statements of 
Strategy to the Annual Regulatory Forum.  The Five Year Reviews can be viewed as 
an accountability or enforcement mechanism in instances where the regulatory 
agency has not adhered to the preferences of the Minister and/or Government.  This is 
not to deny that regulators should be held to account, but what is envisaged here is a 
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blurring between the legislative goals of the regulators and shorter term 
considerations and preferences of Ministers which appear to have no statutory basis 
and may well conflict or compromise the legislative objectives of the regulators.         
Developing Regulatory Expertise in Government Departments38 
Sectoral regulation requires the development not only of an understanding of 
the economics, structure and technology of the sector being regulated but also the 
purpose of regulation, the regulatory regime as well as the intricacies of regulatory 
economics.  These are specialist skills and expertise.  To effectively and efficiently 
monitor and hold to account regulators in the ways described above requires that the 
Departments responsible for such tasks also develop such skills and expertise.  This 
will also be useful in advising Ministers on the impact of any direction that they may 
be considering giving to regulators. 
The government proposes a number of measures to increase regulatory 
capacity within Departments.  There will be a build-up of “additional internal 
expertise through formal training and support for the attainment of relevant 
qualifications” (ibid, paragraph 2.11).  Exchanges with regulators will be considered.  
Structured co-operation between Departments will be utilised.  However, the 
government proposals go further and envisage that Departments will develop training 
and research capacity relevant to the Irish regulatory landscape within third level 
institutions.  International expertise will also be drawn upon as has been the practice 
to date in reviewing regulation (e.g. EIU, 2009).  It is envisaged that these measures 
will “strengthen[ed] the oversight of regulatory arrangements on an ongoing basis … 
enhance the policy advice available to Ministers and allow for the effective conduct 
of periodic reviews” (ibid, paragraph 2.13). 
Appeals Structures 
                                                 
 
 
 
38 In a series of presentations a former and a present regulators of telecoms and aviation, respectively, 
have taken this aspect of the agenda forward.  See, for example, I. Goggin & C. Guiomard, 
“Strengthening Regulatory Capacity,” ESRI Policy Seminar, 26 November 2009. 
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As noted above, there are typically appeal mechanisms from the decisions of 
regulators. Regulators decisions are important often with long lasting effects.  It is 
therefore important that there is an effective review mechanism not only with respect 
to procedural and due process issues but also the substance of regulatory decisions.  
At the present time there are a number of different appeal mechanisms – apart from 
judicial review – including appeals panels and the Commercial Court.39  The 
government proposes no change to the status quo, specifically rejecting the idea of a 
single appeals body.  This rejection is based on the grounds that “basis and 
parameters for potential appeals can vary considerably across sectors, particularly 
having regard to the requirements of EU law” (ibid, paragraph 2.18). 
Engaging with Stakeholders 
Regulators make decisions that impact on consumers and business.  The 
government proposes to change the way in which the input from these groups impacts 
on regulatory decisions in two ways.  First, there will be greater emphasis on the 
consumer interest in the regulators’ decision-making calculus.  Regulators must not 
only be effective regulators but also act as “champions of the consumer interest” 
(ibid, paragraph 6.2).  Second, industry panels or advisory councils will be 
established for the regulators of energy, telecommunications and transport.  
Legislation will also provide for regulators to consult with the National Consumer 
Agency or any dedicated panels it may convene. 
 
3.3 Taking the Government Statement’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Forward 
The Government Statement reforms will in some instances require new 
legislation, which will be the responsibility of the Minister of Finance and relevant 
                                                 
 
 
 
39 In some instances the appeals mechanism, for a given regulatory agency has changed through time.  
For example, in telecommunications, in 2003 ComReg decisions could be appealed to an expert panel 
and then the Courts; however, ComReg was of the view that this was an inappropriately slow process 
and the expert panel appeal was abolished in June 2007 so that appeals are made once again directly to 
the Courts, the situation prior to 2003.  For details see EIU (2009, pp. 129-130). 
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sectoral Ministers.  As yet this legislation has not been introduced.  Such legislation 
should, for example, set out how regulators will be required to take into account 
current/evolving priorities of the Minister, while at the same time conforming to their 
existing statutory objectives. Nevertheless, in the absence of the necessary legislation, 
the proposals will be “pursued in the interim on an administrative basis” (ibid, p. 1).  
One of the first moves to implement the Government Statement proposals was 
the holding of the first Annual Regulatory Forum, in February 2010.  All the 
economic regulators were present as were Ministers and senior departmental officials 
responsible for the economic regulators, together with the Taoiseach and Tanaiste.  
The Annual Economic Forum is seen as one of the key recommendations of the 
Government Statement.  In terms of the issues discussed at the first forum,  
The regulatory system in Ireland is seen as accessible and agile and 
part of the country’s positive environment for business.  It needs to be 
continually adjusted to reflect the changing markets, new 
technological developments, the climate change agenda and 
international regulatory environment.  It must also support new and 
green technology and industries in line with the Government’s 
Framework for Economic Renewal (Building Ireland’s Smart 
Economy) (Department of the Taoiseach, 2010a, p. 1). 
 
It further claimed that the regulators will stress test their regulatory systems to ensure 
that they are sufficiently robust to respond to major shocks.  Other steps to implement 
the Government Statement have also been made such as tendering for a regulatory 
governance programme (Department of the Taoiseach, 2010b). 
 Although perhaps not part of the Government Statement, recent interventions 
by Ministers are consistent with much greater direction and political accountability of 
regulatory agencies to Minister advocated in the Government Statement. These 
interventions go beyond general directions to regulators and relate to specific 
regulatory pricing decisions. In 2009 the Minister responsible for the CER signalled 
to the CER that electricity prices should be lowered.  In a press release the Minister 
stated:  
We have a robust regulatory energy framework in Ireland which is 
transparent and encourages competition.  It is right that we maintain the role 
of the CER as the decision-maker in terms of pricing.  To this end, I am 
asking the energy regulator to undertake an immediate review of options to 
bring forward a reduction in electricity prices.  Based on current trends I 
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expect a double-digit decrease in electricity and gas prices this year 
(DCENR, 2009, p. 1). 
 
This was not a formal statutory based direction by the Minister, but rather via a 
press release. It is an example of what is referred to above as moral suasion.  This 
choice may reflect the fact that the relevant legislation, section 7 of the Energy 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2006, only permits policy directions on “general 
policy.” 
 When the CAR was considering in 2009 the airport charges that Dublin 
Airport Authority (“DAA”) may levy (i.e. maximum charges) at Dublin airport 
for 2010 to 2014, the Minister issued a general policy direction dated 27 October 
2009.40 The direction was issued after the CAR had published its draft 
determination on airport charges at Dublin airport in June 2009 and before the 
CAR’s final determination in December 2009.  The Minister’s direction stated 
that the CAR should ensure that financial viability of DAA is protected. A list of 
government policies is mentioned in this regard including that the DAA is 
operated “on a commercial basis without recourse to Exchequer Funding or an 
equity injection by the State and in that context the need to secure lender 
confidence and raise debt financing on a cost efficient basis” (cited in CAR, 
2009, p. 13).  This was widely interpreted as a signal to the CAR from the 
Minister for the CAR to increase the maximum allowable charges of Dublin 
airport.41    
 Furthermore the statutory mandate of the CAR has been changed such that 
it is more in tune with the aims of the regulated firm, the airport authority and less 
with users or consumers.  In the Aviation Regulation Act, 2001 Section 33 stated 
that the objective of the CAR was in making determinations,  
                                                 
 
 
 
40 This does not appear to have been made public by the Minister – there was no press release on the 
Department of Transport’s website – but portions of the letter were cited in the CAR (2009) final 
determination on the charges at Dublin airport, while the full text of the letter is available on the CAR 
website: http://www.aviationreg.ie/_fileupload/2009-10-29%20Ministerial%20Direction.pdf.  
Accessed 8 October 2010. 
41 See, for example, O’Leary (2010). 
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shall aim to facilitate the development and operation of cost-effective 
airports which meeting the requirements of users …     
 
However, in the State Airports Act 2004, section 22 changes the objectives of the 
CAR so that there are now threefold, 
(a) to facilitate the efficient and economic development and operation 
of Dublin Airport which meet the requirements of current and 
prospective issuers of Dublin Airport, 
(b) to protect the reasonable interests of current and prospective users 
of Dublin Airport in relation to Dublin Airport, and 
(c) to enable Dublin Airport Authority to operate and develop Dublin 
Airport in a sustainable and financially viable manner. 
Arguably the addition of objective (c) is either redundant in that it is implied by (a) or 
it means that the CAR needs to set its rates in such a way that it supports the financial 
interests of Dublin Airport Authority.  Certainly in the three policy directions issued 
by the relevant Minister since the 2004 Act stress the investment and infrastructure 
requirements at Dublin Airport rather than users interests.42,43 
IV. Rationale for Government Statement Proposals 
 
 The Government Statement marks a shift, perhaps substantial, in the balance 
of power between regulatory agencies and Ministers.  It makes regulatory agencies 
much more subject to the changing political preferences of Ministers, whether 
embodied in the Smart Economy document or the preference for green policies.  Such 
a dramatic shift requires careful consideration and justification.  The Government 
Statement does not provide this, although reference is made to the fact that the 
performance of the economic regulators has been evaluated (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2010, p. 1).  Hence reference is made to the EIU (2009) as well as recent 
EU Directives and Regulations on energy and telecommunications which address the 
                                                 
 
 
 
42 These policy directions are dated: 18 August 2005; 3 April 2007; and, as noted in the text, 27 
October 2009.  These policy directions may be found in the CAR’s website: 
http://www.aviationreg.ie/2005_Airport_Charges/Default.120.html.  Accessed 21 December 2010. 
43 An examination of the legislative history of the other economic regulators in Table 1 does not 
suggest a similar evolution.  Based on legislation as presented on regulators websites and other 
documentation such as annual reports. 
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issue of regulatory agency independence.  The latter are important in that they set the 
framework within which national regulatory authorities such as the CER and 
ComReg must operate.  
 
4.1 The Economist Intelligence Unit Report 
Many of the proposals in the Government Statement are consistent with the 
eighteen recommendations of EIU (2009):  the Government Statement is a 
restatement of policy towards regulators; the five year reviews of the mandate of 
regulators; not extending competition powers to other regulators besides ComReg; the 
recognition of the importance of multi-member regulatory commissions; the necessity 
to increase the skill and expertise of departments overseeing regulators; and others.  
In these cases EIU (2009) sets out a rationale for the proposed changes which need 
not be rehearsed here. 
However, where the Government Statement departs company from EIU 
(2009) is, on the one hand, holding regulatory agencies to account through a whole 
series of mechanisms most of which are not recommended by the EIU44 and, on the 
other, ensuring that the regulatory agencies have to take much more cognisance of 
evolving and current government priorities. These two strands of the Government 
Statement are, of course, inter-related. The increase in accountability and political 
direction are likely to be used to ensure that the evolving and current priorities are 
taken into account by regulators.  The net result is that the independence of regulatory 
agencies is likely to be compromised, while their remit will be made more difficult to 
achieve as they struggle to meet both statutory objectives and the current/evolving 
priorities imparted Ministers and/or the Annual Regulatory Forum.   
                                                 
 
 
 
44 The exception is that concerning regular 5-yearly formal review of the mandates of the regulatory 
agencies.  The EIU in making this recommendation acknowledges that “[T]here are some risks 
attached to such a process, such as creating a febrile lobbying environment.  Nevertheless, we believe 
that these are outweighed by the advantages of a regular and fundamental review procedure (ibid, p. 
171).   
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The EIU does not provide a justification for these Government Statement 
reforms; indeed, the latter runs counter to the whole thrust of the EIU report, which 
stresses the importance of independent regulatory agencies:  
The independent status of the regulators is a strength and should be 
retained.  Any attempt to change this would undermine regulatory 
credibility (ibid, p. 12)  
In most cases, economic regulation in Ireland follows a generally 
recognised best practice in being delivered through independent 
regulatory agencies (ibid, p. 163). 
… we recommend that the independent status of the relevant regulators 
should remain unchanged (ibid, p. 163, emphasis in original). 
The EIU report stresses the importance of the independence of regulatory 
agencies for two reasons, both of which are discussed in Section II above. First, the 
EIU points out prior to the move to liberalise markets such as electricity and gas, the 
Minister and government departments “were simultaneously responsible for 
determining policy for the sector, owning the monopoly service provider and 
regulating the market” (ibid, p. 19).45  In order to resolve these potential conflicts 
independent regulatory agencies were created although as the EIU report points out 
this was often required by EU measures (ibid, p. 19).  Since in energy, postal services, 
transport services and infrastructure the state still retains ownership of important 
regulated assets, the reduction in regulatory independence and the greater degree of 
Ministerial direction means that these conflicts are likely to re-emerge.   
Second, independent regulation is an essential requirement in order to 
establish “regulatory credibility and commitment” (ibid, p. 19).   Greater political 
control, combined with a willingness of Ministers to interfere in specific pricing 
decisions of regulators means that regulatory credibility and commitment may be 
compromised.  In addition, as part of this discussion the EIU argues that there is 
trade-off between short-term and long-term gains.  Reduced prices in the short-term 
may lead to less entry and competition in the longer, with resultant higher prices.  If 
                                                 
 
 
 
45 See also ibid, p. 29, p. 39, p. 52. 
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the regulatory agencies are to pay greater heed to the evolving and current priorities 
of Ministers then it is likely that there will be a biased towards short-term gains, given 
the high discount rate of elected representatives.       
Viewed in this context the accountability mechanisms outlined in the 
Government Statement are a step back from independent regulation.  A variety of 
channels, some informal and lacking transparency, are opened by which Ministers 
can influence the behaviour of independent agencies.  Furthermore the kinds of 
topics or subject matter that could be the subject of political influence under these 
mechanisms appear to be very wide indeed.  In this respect it should be noted that 
there already exists Ministerial power to issue policy direction to regulatory 
agencies which has been used to varying degrees depending on the regulatory 
agency (ibid., pp. 39-42).  Why this power is not sufficient is not addressed in the 
Government Statement.46   
4.2 EU Energy and Telecommunications Policy 
The EU has played a critical role in the development of regulation in Ireland.  
It was responsible for the movement towards greater liberalisation of protected 
sectors such as energy, postal services, telecommunications, and so on.  However, its 
influence is not just a once off call for more liberalisation, but rather an ongoing 
programme of reform, marked by a series of directives and regulations.  Hence, given 
the influence of the EU, there may be justification for increase political direction and 
the reduction in the independence of regulators from this source.  However, this is not 
the case.  In a series of recent directives, regulations and guidance notes the EU in 
                                                 
 
 
 
46 The issue was raised in subsequent exchange in the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Economic 
Regulatory Affairs on 19 January 2010 between a Deputy and a member of the interdepartmental 
senior official’s group on economic regulation.  In response to the Deputy’s query as to why policy 
directions were not sufficient, after pointing out that policy directions relate to general policy issues 
not individual decisions, the official continued, that the regulatory forum “will focus on issues of 
competitiveness and cost diversions where they occur.  There is ongoing dialogue which allows these 
issues to be raised with regulators and for regulators to be sensitised in these areas, as long as the 
political system is not making those individual decisions.”  Thus it appears there is a necessity to 
condition regulators to broader policy issues such as competitiveness that for some reason, either 
before or after the dialogue of the Annual Economic Forum, cannot be set down as a policy direction. 
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electricity, gas and telecommunications has made considerable efforts to ensure that 
regulators are independent, specifically referring to the role of government.   
In recent EU reforms of the energy sector, referred to as the Third Package, 
which will come into effect on 3 March 2011, reference is made to the concern that 
the “effectiveness of regulation is frequently hampered through a lack of 
independence of regulators from government, and insufficient powers and discretion” 
(Directive 2009/72, Recital 33).47 The Directive devotes considerable attention to 
ensuring the national regulatory agencies (“NRAs”) such as the CER, are independent 
stating that, “Member States shall guarantee the independence of the regulatory 
authority and shall ensure that it exercises its powers impartially and transparently” 
(ibid, Article 4). For example, the NRA must be legally distinct, not seek or take 
direct instructions from any government or other public or private entity, be able to 
take autonomous decisions with limitations of length of tenure of top management.  
Thus, while it is always difficult to secure independence, these provisions clearly 
indicate the direction that the Third Package wishes to go.48 
The European Commission’s (“the Commission”) interpretative note on the 
Directive in relation to regulatory authorities, the rationale for independent regulatory 
agencies is articulated:   
The provisions on the independence of the NRA’s staff and persons 
responsible for their management are key requirements because they 
are aimed at ensuring that regulatory decisions are not affected by 
political and specific economic interests, thereby creating a stable and 
predictable investment climate (EC, 2010, p. 6). 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
47 The full title of the Directive is: Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC. 
48 Directive 2009/72 contains extensive provisions relating to the general objectives, as well as the 
duties and powers of NRAs.  The general objectives include “promoting … a competitive, secure and 
environmentally sustainable internal market”, “eliminating restrictions on trade in electricity between 
Member States”, and, “facilitating access to the network for new generation capacity” (ibid, Article 
36).  The specification of duties and powers in Article 37 is very extensive.   
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 In the regulatory reform of the electronic communications network in 
Directive 2009/140,49 recital 13 states that,  
The independence of the national regulatory authorities should be 
strengthened in order to ensure a more effective application of the 
regulatory framework and to increase their authority and the 
predictability of their decisions.  To this end, express provision should 
be made in national law to ensure that, in the exercise of its tasks, a 
national regulatory authority responsible for ex-ante market regulation 
… is protected against external intervention or political pressure liable to 
jeopardise its independent assessment of matters coming before it. 
 
Furthermore, in Article 3(a) of the Directive it is stated that “national regulatory 
agencies responsible for ex-ante market regulation … shall act independently and 
shall not seek or take instructions from any other body in relation to the exercise of 
tasks assigned to them under national law implementing Community law.”50 This 
emphasis on independence in telecommunications regulation is longstanding (Doyle, 
1997). 
In sum, the thrust of the Government Statement’s move towards less regulatory 
independence is inconsistent with both the EIU report review of the regulatory 
environment commissioned by government and the EU legislation on independence 
of regulatory agencies in energy and telecommunications. 
V. Two Possible Explanations 
 
The discussion so far thus poses something of a puzzle.  Government policy is 
aimed at reducing regulatory independence of the economic regulators.  However, 
there is little or no support for the Government Statement’s position in either the EIU 
report or recent developments in EU energy and telecommunications regulatory 
                                                 
 
 
 
49 The full title of the Directive is: Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection 
of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation 
of electronic communications networks and services. 
50 Directive 2009/14 also sets out other conditions designed to ensure independence such the 
conditions under which the head (or members of a collegiate body) of a regulatory authority can be 
dismissed and that national regulatory authorities shall have sufficient resources. 
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policy. Indeed, these appear to argue for the maintenance not the erosion of 
regulatory independence.  This raises the obvious question: why?  In this section two 
possible explanations are offered. 
5.1 Independent Regulatory Agencies are Anomalous  
The Irish political system is highly centralised, according to a number of 
indicators. Political scientists, for example, classify countries by the degree to which 
the executive controls the legislature.  In these studies Ireland ends at one extreme in 
terms of executive control of the legislature, with countries such as the Netherlands 
and Sweden, where the Parliament has a much more important role, at the other end 
(Hardiman, 2009, pp. 56-7, & Figure 4, p. 56).  One graphic illustration of this power 
was the passage in less than a day of the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Bill 2010, a 
complex piece of legislation that will give the Minister of Finance considerable 
discretion with respect to credit institutions, for which there was no prior consultation 
and little discussion or critical examination by elected representatives.51  In the area 
of public finance the share of all taxes accounted for by the national government is an 
indicator of the importance of the central government vis a vis sub-national levels of 
government; the higher the percentage of total taxes accounted for by the national 
level of government the greater the importance of the centre.  Figure 1 presents such 
data for 30 OECD countries for 2003.  This shows that Ireland is at one extreme, 
together with Greece, in terms of the share of all taxes accounted for by national 
governments.  It could be argued however, that this indicator is of limited value, since 
given the small size of Ireland sub-national governments are inevitably going to be of 
limited importance.  However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny: for several 
quite small countries such as Iceland (population 400,000) and Denmark (population 
5.5 million) sub-national levels of government are quite important despite a small 
                                                 
 
 
 
51 The European Central Bank (“ECB”) has raised concerns about the legislation so it may be revised, 
despite being passed into law.  The Bill, and explanatory memorandum may be found at: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2010/5810/document1.htm, while 
the opinion of the ECB may be found on its website: 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_92_f.pdf.  All accessed 21 December 2010. 
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population.  Furthermore there are sound grounds in terms of local autonomy and 
accountability for subnational taxation (Bird, 2010; Commission on Taxation, 2009, 
pp. 423-467). 
Figure 1: The tax burden share by level of government OECD-30, as a 
proportion of total taxation revenue, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For a large number of countries, the OECD has not allocated a large proportion of social security 
contributions to any particular level of government. For the purpose of this analysis, these 
contributions have been assigned to the national government. Consequently, some caution should be 
exercised in interpreting these data. 
Source: Australian Treasury estimates reported in Warburton & Hendy (2006). 
 
Regulatory agencies go against the grain in a centralised state. They are, in 
some sense, anomalous or, to use a terms coined for such agencies in Canada, 
“structural heretics.”52  Regulatory agencies are not only independent but seen to be 
independent.  The simple solution to this anomaly would be to abolish such agencies 
and reincorporate the regulatory functions within government departments.  However, 
this would be inconsistent with EU policy and would remove the advantages noted 
above in terms of independent agencies. Thus a compromise is to retain the regulatory 
                                                 
 
 
 
52 See Economic Council of Canada (1979, p. 54) and references cited therein. 
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agencies, but through the mechanisms outlined in the Government Statement, 
Ministers are able to exert much greater control over regulatory agencies. 53 
5.2 Delivering on Social Partnership 
Social partnership is an interest group accommodation model of economic 
governance which has been employed in Ireland since the mid-1980s.54  Whether the 
hiccup in reaching an agreement occasioned by the financial crisis spells the death 
knell of these arrangements is too early to tell.  In any event partnership agreements, 
as they have evolved over time, have come to cover an increasingly wide array of 
economic and social issues, across virtually all sectors of the economy.  Reaching 
these agreements is a complex bargaining process, in which of the groups 
represented, primarily organised labour and business, make various trade-offs, given 
the interests they represent and their objectives.55 Government plays a vital role in not 
only convening and organising such meetings but also in participating in the 
bargaining process and in responding to demands by labour and business for pay and 
other changes in order to facilitate agreement. 
In some instances the social partners demand changes that can only be 
delivered by regulatory agencies.  As noted above IBEC raised the issue of lower 
electricity prices, while earlier in the decade the Irish Congress of Trade Unions had 
raised the issue of whether certain groups, including voice-over actors, could be made 
exempt from competition law. The fact that these regulatory agencies are independent 
                                                 
 
 
 
53 Such an arrangement also has certain political advantages of regulatory agencies in terms of 
responsibility for unpopular decisions such as approving price increases being assigned to the regulator 
not the Minister.  Furthermore, to the extent that Ministers communicate in a non-transparent manner 
evolving priorities and policy preferences, which are then reflected in regulatory decisions, there is a 
danger that Ministers will not be held to account for such priorities/preferences.  Ministerial policy 
directions avoid this problem. 
54 The first partnership agreement covered 1987 to 1990.  For details see Department of the Taoiseach 
(1987).  For a discussion of partnership see Hardiman (2000; 2006). 
55 This view that it is largely self interest which drives participants is not shared by all commentators.  
For example, Dermot McCarthy, Secretary to the Department of the Taoiseach takes a more benign 
view: “[T]he very concept and practice of social partnership reflect, however, imperfectly, the 
conviction that there is a common good and that mutual obligations should be a powerful influence on 
behaviour” (McCarthy, 2009, p.96). 
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of government means that delivering on any government promises or commitments is 
likely to take time and may make explicit costs that may have been implicit. If the 
Minister is responsible for the regulatory decision, then the degree of transparency is 
likely to be less. 
In the case of the issue of electricity prices, in which the Minister requested 
the CER to lower prices – referred to above – the CER (2009a, p. 4) explicitly drew 
attention to the cost of the Minister’s intervention in its proposed decision:  “[T]he re-
profiling is not without risk, as it deviates from established regulatory process 
creating market uncertainty and introducing unpredictability into regulatory 
decisions.”  In the CER’s final decision, which summarised the various submissions 
received, several firms expressed concerns as to the impact of the re-profiling on 
regulatory risk and predictability.   For example, CER (2009b, p. 23) report that: 
“ESB Networks raised their concern that the re-profiling option significantly distorts 
the whole framework of unbundling and price regulation that has been developed 
over the last decade. Further to this it introduces significant additional risk and is 
likely to increase the perceived Regulatory risk in Irish network infrastructure assets 
and consequentially increase the cost of capital.” 
Equally as part of partnership discussions the ICTU were encouraged to see 
whether the Competition Authority would consider certain arrangements exempt 
under the relevant section of the Competition Act.  Although the last word as to 
whether or not a particular set of arrangements is for the Courts to decide, the 
Competition Authority could have indicated that the arrangements were not in its 
view a breach of the Competition Act and as a result no enforcement action would be 
taken.  However, the agency refused to adopt this position and instead took the view 
that the arrangements were anti-competitive. The government is to introduce an 
explicit amendment to the Competition Act exempting the arrangements from the 
law.56  
                                                 
 
 
 
56 For a discussion see Gorecki (2009b). 
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In both cases, and no doubt in others, if regulatory agencies are subject to 
greater political direction with respect to current and evolving priorities, which would 
no doubt include partnership arrangements, then regulatory agencies may be more 
inclined to adhere to such priorities and perhaps not always note the costs. 
The two explanations for the reduction in regulators independence are not 
necessarily, of course, mutually exclusive. Increased Ministerial control could 
simultaneously remove the anomaly for Ireland, and advance social partnership. 
VI. Implications 
 
The Government Statement on Economic Regulation proposes a number of 
sensible reforms to the regulatory system in Ireland that are likely to improve 
regulatory performance. These include: developing regulatory expertise in 
government departments; periodic reviews of regulatory agency mandates and 
structures; not extending competition powers to regulatory agencies beyond ComReg; 
the development of indicators to monitor regulatory agency performance; affirming 
the importance of scrutiny by Oireachtas Committees of the performance of 
regulatory agencies; and, structured co-operation between regulatory agencies.  
However, the Government Statement also, potentially at least, reduces the 
independence of regulatory agencies by a combination of holding regulatory agencies 
to account through a whole series of additional mechanisms, while at the same time 
instructing regulatory agencies to take into account evolving/current priorities.   Thus 
while there is likely to be some improvement in the quality of regulation, there are 
also moves to recentralise power.  
The first meeting of one of these mechanisms, the Annual Regulatory Forum, 
provides a flavour of these priorities including paying attention to the climate change 
agenda and the international regulatory environment, as well as supporting new and 
green technology and the government’s framework for economic renewal, Building 
Ireland’s Smart Economy (Department of the Taoiseach, 2008).  It is difficult to 
gauge the practical effect of reducing the independence of regulatory agencies, in part 
because the legislation required has not been published and in part because there is no 
record as to the impact of the implementation of the proposals.  Hence any 
conclusions must of necessity be tentative. 
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It could be argued that the proposals to reduce regulatory independence will 
be largely symbolic and have little or no practical implications for regulatory 
decisions.  The facts on the ground will not change.  Some of the items mentioned at 
the conclusion of the first Annual Regulatory Forum such as considering new 
technology are already likely to be taken into account by regulatory agencies.  
Furthermore, Ministers are already able to give general policy directions to regulatory 
agencies which have to be followed by the regulatory agency.  Furthermore, it is 
likely to be difficult to formulate legislation that successfully reconciles the need of 
the regulatory agency to take into account, as yet, unspecified evolving/current 
priorities of Ministers with the existing expressly stated statutory objectives of the 
regulatory agency.  Thus the implication of this scenario is that regulatory agency 
independence and performance will be largely unaffected by the Government 
Statement, but nevertheless the public and private costs of regulation will be 
increased due, on the one hand, to the raft of mechanisms designed to both increase 
regulatory accountability and impart the evolving/current priorities of Ministers to 
regulatory agencies, and, on the other, to the rent seeking behaviour of regulated 
firms – whether public or privately-owned – as they seek to effect the priorities of 
Ministers.  Hence the advantages of an independent regulatory agency outlined above 
are unlikely to be seriously undermined, although they may be somewhat attenuated. 
There is, however, an alternative scenario which sees the Government 
Statement as presaging much greater Ministerial direction and intervention.  In this 
respect the Government Statement cannot be seen in isolation from other policy 
developments.  As noted above, in 2009 Ministers intervened with respect to 
regulatory pricing decisions.  The recent legislation for the NTA permits the 
appointment of the Chairman by the Minister without any competition for the post.  
The Government Statement’s proposals were not subject public consultation.57  The 
                                                 
 
 
 
57 It is, of course, the case that in preparing its report that the EIU consulted extensively with various 
stakeholders including the regulators, organisations representating business (e.g. Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation, Small Firms’ Association), labour (Irish Congress of Trade Unions), and 
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legislation under which regulators will be required to take into account 
evolving/current priorities may be no more than regulatory agencies shall have regard 
to such priorities; in other words, a somewhat soft policy direction.  
The likely impact of greater Ministerial intervention in regulatory decisions 
will be to make the regulatory agency’s tasks more difficult and complex. First, the 
regulatory agency is likely to face multiple goals, some of which may conflict.  This 
is analogous to the EIU (2009, p.166) concerns about mission creep - “additional 
functions and tasks being added at the expense of focus on core [regulatory] 
objectives.”  The evolving/current priorities that regulatory agencies might have to 
face can be illustrated by an examination of the Key Actions in Building Ireland’s 
Smart Economy.  All regulators when examining new investments would have to 
have review “capital investment allocations … to identify the scope for re-priorisation 
towards more labour-intensive activities” (Department of the Taoiseach, 2008, p. 10).  
ComReg would have to show regard for “equipping second-level schools with 100Mb 
per second broadband connectivity” (ibid, p. 16).  The CER would have to take into 
account the “increase [in] the production of renewable electricity in a cost-effective 
manner to meet the new increased target of 40% of electricity from renewable 
resources by 2020,” as well as facilitating the building of an additional 400MW of 
wind electricity generating capacity over 2008-2010 (ibid, p. 17).   
Second, regulatory agencies make decisions that reflect the long-run, given the 
nature of the investments made in energy, telecommunications, and airports.  Thus 
the emphasis is on providing stability and certainty in regulatory procedures and 
                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
members of the Oireachtas, while it was well flagged by Government that it was going to undertake 
such an international benchmarking study.  Hence it could be argued that there was little need to 
consult on the Government Statement.  However, it is not clear that the case for no further consultation 
is compelling.  First, as noted above, in some important respects the Government Statement differs 
from the EIU report.  Thus the prior consultation by the EIU in preparing its report may be of limited 
usefulness with respect to these Government Statement proposals.  Second, while many interest groups 
were consulted by the EIU, not all groups or individuals were consulted with an interest and expertise 
in public administration and regulation. Third, the Government White Paper, Regulating Better, talks 
about the need to consult more widely before regulating (Department of the Taoiseach, 2004, p. 26).  
While the Government Statement is not concerned with new regulation it is nevertheless an important 
policy document concerned with the way that regulation is monitored, structured and administered. 
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parameters in making major decisions in areas such as prices and investment.  
However, evolving/current priorities are much more likely to be driven by short-term 
considerations that may well prove transitory.  Hence there is a mismatch in the time 
horizon over which regulatory decisions refer as between the needs of the regulated 
firm(s) for certainty and predictability and the desire of Ministers for more immediate 
considerations to enter the decision-making process.  Thus given the potential adverse 
impact of such interventions, every attempt should be made to ensure that very 
careful consideration is given of the costs and benefits and consequences, both 
intended and unintended of such interventions.   
By lessening the independence of regulators and assigning them responsibility 
for new evolving/current priorities in addition to core responsibilities there is a danger 
that neither set of objectives will be met.  Government policy towards the CBFSAI 
provides a case example of multiple (and conflicting objectives) and Ministers 
imparting evolving/current priorities.  The CBFSAI was given statutory responsibility 
for micro-prudential supervision and promoting the financial sector.  Promoting the 
financial sector was seen as consistent with a regulatory approach “which was and 
was perceived to be excessively deferential and accommodating; insufficiently 
challenging and not persistent enough. This meant not moving decisively and 
effectively enough against banks with governance issues” (Honohan, 2010, p. 16).  
Attempts by CBFSAI to introduce Directors’ Compliance Statements despite being 
approved by the Oireachtas in legislation, were unsuccessful, in part because the 
relevant Department and Minister conveyed evolving/current priorities that such a 
move might damage the competitiveness of the sector (ibid, pp. 48-51).   The high 
profile received concerning the promotional aspect of the mandate of the CBFSAI, 
arguably was at the expense of micro-prudential matters relating to the stability of the 
banking system, and exacerbated the impact of the financial crisis on Ireland.  Indeed, 
the reaction of government to that crisis was to remove the “promotional” aspect of 
the CBFSAI’s mandate, while Directors’ Compliance Statements are being 
introduced. 
Neither of the posited outcomes of the Government Statement with respect to 
regulatory independence is likely to improve economic performance, although one is 
clearly much more damaging than the other.  Both reduce the credibility of the pre-
commitment that independent regulatory agencies supply, which is vital for sound 
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pricing and investment decisions in regulated sectors.  More intervention by Ministers 
is likely to raise the sceptre of increased uncertainty occasioned by the conflicting 
pressures on the Minister in his or her various roles.  Regulated firms, whether 
publicly or privately-owned, are likely to try to put pressure on the Minister to 
influence a regulatory agency.  Such adverse outcomes suggest that some thought 
might be given to a consultation exercise to give full consideration to these reforms in 
the Government Statement before they are set in practice and statute.  
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